Perspectives Paper No. 21, September 11, 2006
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa.perspectives21.html
Strategic Follies:
Israel’s Mistakes in the Second Lebanese War
Efraim Inbar
Executive Summary: Israel’s political and military leadership was
ill-prepared for the war against the Hizballah in the summer of 2006. A
series of strategic mistakes on the part of Israeli leaders denied Israel a
military victory and squandered an important opportunity to destroy the
majority of Hizballah’s military presence in Southern Lebanon, settle scores
and enhance Israel’s deterrence. Hopefully, Israeli leadership will be
better strategically prepared so as to attain a clearly-defined victory in
the next round.
Israel’s political and military leadership was ill-prepared for the war
against the Hizballah in the summer of 2006. Israeli leaders displayed
strategic blindness on several accounts, denying the IDF victory in an
important war.
Firstly, Israeli political and military leaders erred in believing that
Israeli pressure on the weak Lebanese government could generate a political
process whereby Hizballah would be weakened and the Lebanese army would
achieve a monopoly over the use of force in Lebanon.
From the earliest stages of the war, Israeli leaders insisted that they
could force Lebanon to become a regular state and act accordingly, and that
Israel’s army would crush Hizballah’s Lebanese state-within-a-state. Quite
incredibly, senior Israeli officials actually believed that something could
be done to overcome the historical social and religious rifts that pull
Lebanese society apart. In 1982, Israel unsuccessfully attempted to restore
Christian hegemony in Lebanon. By 2006, Israel should have realized that it
cannot “fix” Lebanon (nor the hopeless situation of the Palestinians).
Even the incomparably stronger US has proven incapable of political
engineering in the Middle East. Its meager achievements in Iraq and
Afghanistan testify to the inhabitants’ resistance to changing old habits.
Israel should have adopted a more modest goal in its use of force, focusing
on neutralizing the rivals’ capability to harm Israel. Use of force can be
most effective when directed at disrupting military capabilities; not in
creating a new political environment.
Similarly misguided was the idea, suggested by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, of replacing the ineffective UNIFIL with another international
force, albeit one “more robust” and better equipped. The hope that such an
international contingent could assure the demilitarization of Southern
Lebanon and the enforcement of an arms embargo against the Hizballah in
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701 – is totally unfounded.
It is clear already that even the European troops participating in the “new”
UNIFIL have no intention of using their weapons to implement the resolution.
Indeed, UN secretary general Kofi Annan has advocated “flexibility” in the
deployment of UNIFIL along the Syria-Lebanon border, meaning that UNIFIL
will not bother the Hizballah.
This dangerously naive new faith in the UN – a morally bankrupt and totally
ineffective institution – was also reflected in Jerusalem’s involvement in
the drafting of the UN resolution. It was actually the first time in the
history of the wars waged by Israel that Jerusalem had waited for the UN to
call for a ceasefire in order to end a war. The presence of an international
force – the result of misguided diplomacy – will interfere primarily with
Israel’s freedom of action against the Hizballah, especially as the
Hizballah rebuilds its military capabilities.
Worse still is the fact that this unforgivable Israeli diplomatic naïveté
may yet lead to the introduction of an international force in the West Bank,
something that would be extremely detrimental to Israel’s interests.
Israel’s public efforts to calm Syria during the war were ill-advised as
well. Israel’s leaders repeatedly stated that Israel had no intention of
expanding its military activities to target Syria. Instead of putting
pressure on Damascus to stop the shipments of arms to Hizballah – weapons
that have caused great pain in Israel and have allowed the organization to
resist the central Lebanese government – Israeli leaders went out of their
way to communicate to Syria that Damascus can continue bleeding Israel by
proxy with no fear of paying a price for its aggressive behavior.
Fear of escalation clouded the strategic judgment of Ehud Olmert’s
government. Olmert forgot that in the past, escalation has been an effective
tool in coercing Israel’s rivals into accepting its conditions.
Israel’s leadership also failed to understand the strategic significance of
the cumulative effect of numerous Katyusha strikes. (The leadership’s
nonchalant attitude toward the Qassam rockets fired by Hamas from Gaza
reflects a similar underestimation.) Most short-range Katyushas indeed fell
in empty fields and caused little damage. But when thousands of such rockets
were launched, hundreds hitting urban areas, the whole of northern Israel,
including its main port and many strategic installations, was paralyzed and
in danger of destruction. Israel’s failure to allocate sufficient funds for
development of an adequate defense against this type of threat is a
strategic mistake.
Another strategic folly was over-reliance on air power. It is of course very
tempting to use Israel’s unmatched air force. The IAF offers spectacular
destruction with almost no Israeli casualties. However, while the air force
was extremely efficient in destroying Hizballah’s long-range missiles and
their launchers, it was incapable of dealing effectively with the
short-range Katyushas. Only ground forces could have performed the job.
The pilots at the helm of the IDF seem to have been unable to grasp this
fact. Their hesitation and the reluctance of the political leadership to
employ infantry battalions allowed Hizballah to continuously barrage Israeli
cities with Katyushas for an entire month, granting Hizballah the claim to
victory at the end of the war.
The reluctance to commit ground troops to battle also betrays a terrible gap
between the leadership and the people in Israel. Israel’s political and
military leaders mistakenly believe that Israel’s society is tired of the
protracted conflict and is unwilling to pay the price of continuous war.
Olmert said as much in the past, reflecting a sense of weariness at the
leadership level. Decision makers in the Oslo process were also motivated by
such sentiments and by a similar misperception of Israeli society. Thus,
casualty aversion became a main feature of Israel’s military modus operandi.
While the need to avoid reckless loss of human life is self-evident, Israeli
society has in fact shown great resilience in war. It stood strong in the
face of the terror campaign designed to break Israeli society launched by
the Palestinians in September 2000. Similarly, during the recent war in
Lebanon, tremendous determination and willingness was exhibited by the home
front to carry the brunt of the battle.
Given the clear threat posed by Hizballah, there was enthusiastic backing
for offensive operations, even if military casualties were inevitable. A
huge majority of Israelis lent full support to the war. They wanted an
unequivocal victory and were ready to pay a high price for achieving it.
A series of strategic follies resulted in an unsuccessful war for Israel.
Most of Hizballah’s military presence in Southern Lebanon indeed could have
been destroyed. Unfortunately, Israel’s political and military leadership
had no clear concept of what victory over Hizballah entailed. It wasted an
important opportunity to settle scores and enhance Israel’s deterrence.
Israel cannot afford such failures. Hopefully, Israeli leadership will be
better prepared with appropriate military and diplomatic strategies for
attaining a clearly-defined victory in the next round.
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Efraim Inbar is Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University and
the director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
For the BESA Center website, go to http://www.besacenter.org
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