By: Louis Rene Beres and Lt. General (USAF/Ret.) Thomas McInerney

This week’s column by Professor Beres is co-authored with a very distinguished figure in this country’s most senior military community, Lt. General (USAF/Ret.) Thomas McInerney.

A recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) states that Iran has abandoned its earlier plan to acquire nuclear weapons. Although it is now widely and authoritatively understood that this NIE is entirely off the mark – and that it may in fact have been contrived as an intentional falsehood – the net effect has been to make it more difficult to act preemptively against Iran. Accordingly, said Major General (Res.) Aharon Ze’evi Farkash, former Director of Israeli (IDF) Military Intelligence: “…the NIE opens the way for Iran to achieve its military nuclear ambitions without any interference.”

As I (Professor Beres) have indicated many times right here in The Jewish Press: International law is not a suicide pact. Israel is under no legal obligation to sit back passively and await annihilation from a country that is openly sworn to destroy it. In this connection, however, legal right and operational readiness are two distinctly separate issues. From a tactical standpoint, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) likely remains better prepared to launch defensive first strikes against Iranian hard targets than the much-smaller Israel Air Force (IAF).

A U.S. act of anticipatory self-defense against Iran could have multiple beneficiaries. It could do more than protect Israel from any prospective Iranian nuclear aggression. It could also be in the clear security interests of the United States. After all, Iranian nuclear assets and materials could be shared with Iranian surrogate or otherwise aligned groups, including Hizbullah and al-Qaeda, which could then threaten the American homeland. Here it should be understood that missiles are not the only possible nuclear delivery vehicles, and that anti-American terrorists could do just fine with cars, trucks or even ships.

With regard to the still-ongoing Iranian nuclear menace, American and Israeli interests are now essentially congruent. But if neither Washington nor Jerusalem should display an apt willingness to strike preemptively against an openly genocidal regime in Tehran (again, perhaps because of the inhibiting effects of the U.S. NIE), Israel may have to consider “living” with a nuclear Iran. Significantly, any such attempt to coexist with a religiously determined adversary would probably be destined to fail. This is the case because Tehran would not likely meet the most basic expectation of stable nuclear deterrence. This is the absolutely indispensable assumption of rationality.

Israel is known to possess the Arrow anti-missile system for its active defense. This system has been tested successfully on many occasions, and is certainly the very best that has been assembled anywhere on earth. Nonetheless, defending “soft” targets (civilian populations) from nuclear attack requires a near 100 percent reliability of interception, and no system of ballistic missile defense can ever really be entirely “leak proof.” Moreover, as we have already noted above, even if Israel’s Arrow could intercept all incoming enemy missiles, Iran might still plan to share some of its developing nuclear weapons and technologies with Hizbullah proxies in Lebanon and/or with al-Qaeda.

Should the U.S. decide to launch preemptive strikes against pertinent Iranian hard targets, its strike force could comprise approximately 75 stealth attack aircraft – B2s, F 117s and the F22s. Also included would be some 250 nonstealth F15s, F16s, B52s and three carrier battle groups. Each carrier battle group could contain over 120 F18s, and a large inventory of cruise missiles.

The U.S. has over 1000 UAVs for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Iraq theatre. These could support a decisive campaign to convince Tehran that we can hit Iranian nuclear development facilities, command and control structures, integrated air defenses, Air Force and Navy units, and the Shihab 3 missiles, using over 2,500 aim points.

If Israel’s BMD systems were maximally efficient in their expected operational reliability, even an irrational Iranian adversary armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons could be controlled. This means that even if Israel’s nuclear deterrent were immobilized by an enemy state willing to risk a massive “counter-value” Israeli reprisal, that aggressor’s first-strike could still be blocked by Arrow. But the needed efficiencies are simply not achievable.

To deal with the mounting Iranian nuclear threat, Israeli planners cannot assume enemy irrationality in all cases. Quite the contrary. Although such irrationality is certainly a distinct possibility, and must be considered carefully, it is by no means the only cause for concern in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv and Washington. Even a fully rational nuclear Iran would represent a significant existential threat.

Israel, therefore, must take prompt steps to strengthen and sustain a credible nuclear deterrence posture. To be deterred, any rational adversary will always need to calculate, inter alia, that Israel’s second-strike forces are sufficiently invulnerable to first-strike attacks. Facing the Arrow, this adversary would now require many more missiles to achieve an assuredly destructive first-strike against Israel. The Arrow would always compel a rational adversary to delay any intended first-strike attack against Israel until such time as it could deploy a more substantial nuclear and/or biological offensive missile force. Hence, the Arrow may already help Israel by buying time.

In sum, Israel must continue to develop, test and implement an interception capability to match the growing threat dictated by enemy missile capabilities. It must also prepare for certain possible preemptions, and for enhancing the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. In the best of all possible worlds, the United States would soon acknowledge its coincident strategic interests with Israel, and prepare to participate in possible forms of anticipatory self-defense against Iran.

Neither the United States nor Israel is now required to leave Iran to the plainly anemic sanctions of the United Nations, and/or to the inherent and probably irremediable shortcomings of BMD technologies. The recent American National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iranian nuclear intentions is a lie. It should not be allowed to interfere with altogether essential national security preparations in Washington or in Jerusalem.

A final observation: In addition to the compelling threat of a defensive strike against Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures, one other reasonable option may be considered. This would involve empowering the Iranian people against its despotic and dangerous leadership by removing their main opposition groups from U.S. and Western lists of designated terrorist organizations. Moreover, such empowerment could “kickstart” stalled diplomacy, place the current Iranian regime on the defensive, and even reinforce the prospect of American preemption/anticipatory self-defense. In essence, we are speaking here of a regime change that would be initiated within Iran, a still-promising option drawn from the substantial and very meticulous research of the Washington-based Iran Policy Committee.

Copyright © The Jewish Press, March 7, 2008. All rights reserved.

This entry was posted on Monday, March 10th, 2008 and is filed under opinion. You can leave a response.