By Amir Oren, Haaretz Correspondent 6 November 2006
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/784053.html

Syria and Hezbollah are likely to start a war against Israel next summer,
according to General Staff assessments that have been gathered during a
series of meetings in recent weeks.

While there is no specific estimate concerning the timing of a potential
attack, all preparations are being made to ensure maximum preparedness in
advance of summer 2007.

Since the lessons of the war in Lebanon have not yet been finalized in
reports, it was decided to consider 2007 as an interim period, and to make
decisions concerning a multiple-year force build-up only at the end of that
year.

Meanwhile, two important interim decisions were made during the recent
deliberations: The development, within three years, of a system capable of
intercepting 220 mm. and 302 mm. surface-to-surface rockets, of the sort
that Hezbollah used to target Haifa and other towns during the recent war;
and to wait to make a final decision with respect to cancellation of the
Merkava tank production line.

The rocket interceptor system will be developed on the basis of existing
missiles, and according to future developments of these platforms.

Regarding the Merkava, an analysis of the use of tanks during the fighting
in Lebanon in the July-August campaign, and particularly the performance of
the Merkava Mark-4, suggests that if properly deployed, the tank can provide
its crew with better protection than in the past.

The conclusion is that the Israel Defense Forces still requires an annual
supply of dozens of advanced tanks in order to replace the older, more
vulnerable versions that are still in service.

Also, it was decided to postpone for a year the decision made by the
previous defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, on shortening the duration of
military service for conscripts by four to eight months, which was to go
into effect in March 2007.

Retaining the current terms of service will allow the necessary training to
enable divisions to be prepared for combat and to heighten their
effectiveness in battle.

The IDF would also like to relinquish control of the Home Front Command and
pass on responsibility for coordinating the police and other relevant
authorities to a civilian entity.

This view has been presented by the IDF to the National Security Council,
which is expected to oversee this coordination.

In its evaluation of Israel’s strategic capabilities for the interim and
long-term, the General Staff relies on the assessments of Military
Intelligence and the work of the Planning Directorate.

At the end of a series of General Staff meetings, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz
designated five main areas, or scenarios, that the IDF must seriously
consider:

Preparation for conflagration in the north: A war initiated by Syria or
Hezbollah, separately or together, with backing from Iran. The likelihood is
that such a conflagration will erupt in the next two years, peaking in the
spring-summer months of 2007.

Among the reasons for tension: a growing sense of “success” among forces in
the region that oppose Israel and the West.

A decision in Washington to withdraw the majority of its forces from Iraq
will contribute to this atmosphere and will necessitate concentrating on the
possibility that Iraq may become part of an eastern front comprising Iran
and Syria. Military Intelligence estimate that there are 5,000 Katyushas in
southern Lebanon, even after IDF mop-up operations there.

Asymmetric fighting: Hostile Arab states, with Syria at the lead, and
paramilitary organizations, prominent among them Hezbollah, have
relinquished ? even before the fighting in Lebanon and as a consequence of
it ? the possibility of a direct confrontation with Israel.

In their view, Israel’s superiority in both air and armored forces negates
the chances of a major ground offensive succeeding.

Instead they have opted for a war of continuous attrition, with the
deployment of infantry forces heavily equipped with anti-tank weapons,
commando units, ballistic weapons and tunnel access.

In countering them, the IDF would like to develop necessary preparedness,
partly overt, in an effort to deter them, or in case of failure, to achieve
a significant military gain quickly, along parameters determined by the
political leadership.

Terror: Continuous effort on the Palestinian front to carry out terrorist
attacks, with increasingly overt direction by the Hamas government. This
places a question mark over the IDF’s intention, following the abduction of
Gilad Shalit, to develop a working relationship with the Hamas government,
aimed at achieving a long-term cease-fire.

The arming of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in recent months, and the ongoing
refusal to accept the terms put forth by the Quartet (recognition of Israel,
relinquishing violence, acceptance of previous PLO accords with Israel),
lend weight to the adoption of an offensive strategy.

The final say on this matter belongs to the political leadership.

The expected escalation in terrorism also includes the gradual but
increasing role of the global Jihadist element, and a regional movement
operating in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and other states affiliated with Al
Qaida.

Long-range challenges: The focus here is mainly on Iran, which is considered
to be a growing threat, even though it does not pose an immediate threat in
the coming year. Its place on the list of priorities is relatively low, and
stems from the fact that there has been no need to immediately alter the
preparations of air, sea and intelligence units in dealing with it.

Advanced Western equipment in armies of the region: Aircraft, naval vessels,
missiles, armored vehicles in armies whose governments have peace treaties
with, or do not have immediate hostile policies toward Israel, but who could
become immediate threats upon the collapse of their regime, or in-fighting
over succession, and the rise of hostile regimes.

The United States will try to preserve the principle of “quality advantage”
in favor of the IDF, by making available the most advanced systems to
Israel, while delivering to (currently) moderate states systems lacking the
more sophisticated upgrades.

This entry was posted on Tuesday, November 7th, 2006 and is filed under opinion.