“One hears a great deal these days, from people whose vision is shorter even then their memories, about the wisdom of international guarantees as a means of assuring Israeli security. I can’t imagine a more misdirected policy than to ask Israel, which has been the model of self reliant ally, to transform itself into an American dependency… Much of the history of international guarantees is the history of countries who have lost their territory, their freedom and even their sons and daughters… It is a history that the Israelis, for their reasons, and we, for ours, ought to do everything possible to avoid.”

– Senator Henry M. Jackson, December 18, 1973

The United States will consider offering Israel some kind of “security guarantees” in conjunction with an Israeli surrender of the Golan Heights, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared in June.(1) Such “guarantees” might include American troops being stationed between the Israeli and Syrian lines, according to Defense Secretary Les Aspin.(2) An even more explict description of this possibility was recent offered by Israeli cabinet minister Moshe Shahal, who said that the Israeli government and the Clinton administration have discussed an arrangement whereby Israel would withdraw from the Golan and Aerican soldier would be stationed in some parts of the territory fro a period of 15 years. (3)

Such a commitment on the part of the United States would represent a startling departure from the norms of the traditional American-Israeli relationship. Unlike Aermica’s other allies aroudn the world, Israel has never requested that U.S. soldiers risk their lives to protect Israel from its Arab attackers. The Jewish State has only asked that the U.S., in the framework of a mutually beneficial strategic relationship, provide Israel with the military assistance it needs to fight its own battles. For more than four decades, Israel has stood alone in the Middle East as an outpost of Western values, as a guardian of Western interests in a strategically crucial region, and as a unbeding buffer, first against Soviet encroachment, and now against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Israel freely shared vital intelligence data with the United States. Israel battle tested American weapons. Israel took military action at America’s request, as in 1970 when an Israeli show of force prevented Syria’s invasion of Jordan. In return, the U.S. has generously provided Israel with weapons it has needed to defend itself against Arab invasions and terrorism. But never was there any suggestion that America should send its troops to fight for Israel, as they fought for South Korea, South Vietnam, Grenada or Kuwait. On the contrary, the Israelis have always prided themselves on their independence and self-reliance. It makes no sense for the United States to deviate from the norms of this time honored, and consistently productive, relationship with Israel.

Perhaps it is not surprising that there are those who assume that a foreign military presence would be necessary to protect the Jewish State, when one considers the vulnerability of the pre-1967 borders to which the Clinton administration apparently expects Israel to retreat. If it surrenders the disputed territories, Israel would be reduced to a strip of land just nine miles wide. The well-equipped Arab armies that surround it would have little trouble sliving the country in two. What portion of those territories would Israel need to protect itself? To answer that question, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, shortly “without regard to political factors,” what territory Israel needed to retain to defend itself against future Arab aggression. Their conclusions are instructive.

Regarding the Golan Heights, the Joint Cheifs noted that before 1967, the Syrians had used the Heights to launch “sabotage and terrorist acts,” and also to carry out “shellings of villages from the high ground overlooking the [Galilee].” Therefore, the Joint Chiefs concluded, “Israel must hold the commanding terrain east of the [pre-1967] coundary… To provide a defense in-depth, Israel would need a strip of about 15 miles [on the Golan]” –an area even larger than that which Israel currently holds.

Surveying Israel’s security needs in Judea and Samaria, the Joint Chiefs found that the area had been used for “sabotage and mining activity” by Palestinian Arab terrorists before Israel took over in 1967. Furthermore, “the high ground running north-south through the middle of [Judea and Samaria] overlooks Israel’s narrow midsection and offers a route for a thrust to the sea which would split the country in two parts.” At “a minimum,” the Joint Chiefs concluded, Israel needs to control that high ground — in other words, an area comprising the majority of the Judea-Samaria region.

With regard to the Gaza Strip, the Joint Chiefs minced no words: Israel needs the entire territory. “By occupying the Gaza Strip, Israel would trade approximately 45 miles of hostile border for eight. Configured as it is, the strip serves as a salient for introduction of Arab subversion and terrorism, and its retention would be to Israel’s military advantage.”(4)

The question that must be faced, then, is whether or not the U.S. shoudl urge Israel to put itself in a vulnerable position, surrendering those vital strategic territories and relying on American troops to defend it against future Arab attacks. Would the U.S. be prepared to activate those troops and risk thier lives if a Syrian-Israeli crisis develops? Is it possible to be confident that five or ten years from now, U.S. public opinion will support such military action? How will Americans react when U.S. troops in the Golan are attacked by the same fanatical anti-American Hezbollah terrorists who attacked them in nearby Lebanon not so long ago?

What is at stake is not the sincerity of America;s intentions, but rather the inevitability of America’s ever shifting agenda. Political and social circumstances often produce sharp changes in public and Congressional preceptions of U.S. military interests abroad. Commitments made with all good intentions by one administration may fall by the wayside when a different administration, with different goals and a different worldview, assumes power. The history of American guarantees to its small allies is not a laundry list of betrayals but rather a manifestation of the simple reality that in the democracy, voters, Congressmen and presidents often change their minds about commitments made by their predescessors.

This entry was posted on Thursday, July 4th, 2002 and is filed under series.