U.S. Guarantees: The Case of Taiwan

Citizens of Taiwan who were keeping an eye on the American presidential campaign of 1976 must have been impressed by the statements made by the Democratic candidate regarding America’s longstanding pledge to protect their tiny island nation from Communist China. “We are bound by a treaty to guarantee the freedom of Formosa, Taiwan, the Republic of China,” Jimmy Carter declared at one point in the campaign. “I wouldn’t go back on a commitment that we have had to assure that Taiwan is protected from military takeover.” (11) During one of the televised debates between the two contenders, Carter reiterated that he “would never let that friendship [with Peking] stand in the way of preservation of the independence and freedom of the people of Taiwan.” (12)

Carter’s statement were faithful to longstanding U.S. policy. Following the conquest of mainland China by Communist forces in 1949, the Chinese nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, fled to the neighboring island of Taiwan, where, with American support, they established themselves as the Republic of China. Their Communist rivals, declaring themselves to be the People’s Republic of China, refused to relinquish their claim to Taiwan. Threats by Red China to Quemoy and other small islands off the Taiwan coast in the early 1950s prompted the Eisenhower administration to formalize its commitment to protect Taiwan from Communist aggression by signing a U.S.- Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty, in December 1954.

The text of the Defense Treaty committed the U.S. “to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities” aimed at Taiwan’s “territorial integrity and political stability.” (Article II). The U.S. pledged (Article V) that it would regard any “armed attack in the west Pacific area directed against the territories of [Taiwan]” to be “dangerous to its own peace and safety,” and “would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”(13)

Not surprisingly, Red China was furious at America’s commitment to Taiwan. It conditioned the establishment of relations with the U.S. on full American recognition of Communist China as the sole legitimate government of both the mainland and Taiwan; the complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Taiwan, which numbered about 8,500 by the early 1970s; the formal abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty; and a halt to U.S. arms supplies to Taiwan.

While American military strategists consistently regarded the U.S. defense of Taiwan as integral to the protection of American interests in south Asia, and while public opinion surveys consistently found that a substantial majority of Americans favored maintaining the U.S.-Taiwanese alliance, other considerations eventually began to erode American’s commitment. Foremost among these was the foreign policy orientation of President Richard Nixon.

Although during his vice-presidential years Nixon had distinguished himself as a unbending opponent of Communist China and vociferous defender of Taiwan, the foreign policy theme of detente, which President Nixon shaped together with Henry Kissinger, called for accommodation of Communist regimes. The Vietnam debacle put additional pressure on Nixon to produce a foreign policy triumph that would shore up his domestic support. China, he decided, was the answer.

Within two weeks of his inauguration, in early 1969, Nixon arranged for secret contacts to be made, in Poland, with the Communist Chinese to help pave the way for a U.S.-Red China rapprochement. That fall, during the United Nations debate over admission of Communist China, there were further signs of a shift in America’s backing for Taiwan. Whereas previously the U.S. had unalterably opposed admitting the Red Chinese, it now changed to a position of opposing admission only if the expulsion of Taiwan was made a precondition for admission, as the Communists insisted. The American shift helped pave the way for the October 1971 expulsion of Taiwan and admission of Red China, over nominal U.S. opposition.

In February 1972 Nixon made his historic visit to China. The Shanghai Communique, issued jointly by Nixon and his Chinese counterparts at the conclusion of the visit, marked a sharp break with previous American policy. The statement began by asserting that the U.S. “acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Technically the “one China” position could accurately refer to both the Red Chinese claim that they are the legitimate rulers of both the mainland and Taiwan, as well as Taiwan’s official position that it is the legitimate ruler of the mainland. In practice, however, there was a vast difference between the two claims: whereas for the Taiwanese the concept of one China is a distant dream that they have never taken any steps to advance, for Communist China it is an active policy goal that it pursued during the 1950s by shelling Taiwan’s offshore islands and which it would have pursued further is not for American intervention. (This difference between the theory and reality of the competing claims finds echoes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although Israelis are aware that their Biblical and historical rights give them the superior right to considerably more territory than is presently in their possession, they have never made any attempt, except in absolute self-defense, to capture any of those areas. The Arabs, by contrast, have not merely dreamed of conquering all of Israel but have waged active warfare for nearly a century to attain that goal.)

From the practical point of view, the most significant aspect of the Shanghai Communique was Nixon’s declaration that the U.S. “affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” (14) During Nixon’s term of office, and that of his successor, Gerald Ford, who followed Nixon’s lead on China, American troop strength in Taiwan was reduced from 8,500 to just 1,400. A Republican president had fulfilled the first two conditions laid down by Red China for normalization of relations with the United States. A Democratic president would take the final step.

Jimmy Carter’s plan to reverse American policy regarding Taiwan was not supported by domestic opinion, which polls showed to be consistently sympathetic to Taiwan. (15) Congressional sentiment was also consistently pro-Taiwan, as manifested in the Dole-Stone resolution of July 1978 (passed by the Senate by a vote of 94-0), which asked the administration to consult with Congress before changing U.S policy toward China. Yet Carter believed, correctly, that support for Taiwan was side but not deep; most Americans did not care enough about the issue to impede a presidential policy shift. Thus on December 15, 1978, Carter announced that he was scrapping the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (except for a limited number of defensive weapons) and extending full U.S. recognition to Red China. Shifting perceptions of U.S. strategic needs and three American presidents, two Republicans and one Democrat, to reverse a commitment made to an American ally by their predecessors.

Israelis were shaken by Carter’s shift on Taiwan. In a statement that was forceful despite the requirements of diplomatic protocol, the Israeli government declared: “Israel must give thorough consideration to the U.S. decision about Taiwan and reconsider Washington’s ability to maintain its obligations under its agreements and treaties with other nations.” (16) Leading Congressional voices sympathized with Israel’s concern. “Can we now fault Israel for its caution in Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah).(17) Rep. Norman F. Lent (R-NY) agreed that Carter’s decision “to abandon our staunch ally of thirty years” raises “a most disturbing question: Will Israel be abandoned just as casually?” Lent called on the Carter administration “to assure Israel and our other allies throughout the world that they would not be sold down the river through some new presidential move made in hope of improving the President’s political image.” Without such reassuring action, Lent warned, “Israel and all of our friends in the world will continue to feel the chill of doubt and uncertainty.” (18)

This entry was posted on Sunday, July 7th, 2002 and is filed under series.